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HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND LAND USE 
CONTROL AT THE STATE LEVEL-VERMONT'S ACT 
250 
Robert L. McCullough* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Vermont has enacted several types of legislation as a means of 
protecting its historic sites. The Vermont Historic Preservation Act 
established a division for historic preservation which coordinates 
historic preservation activities on behalf of the state. 1 The Vermont 
Planning and Development Act allows municipalities to adopt zoning 
regulations which contain design control districts. Buildings within 
these districts may not be modified or demolished without approval 
from a planning commission.2 Perhaps the most innovative legislation 
is Vermont's Land Use and Development Law, commonly known as 
Act 250, which was enacted in 1970 with the broad objective of 
preventing Vermont land from being used in a manner detrimental 
to the environment. 3 
Act 250 established a state environmental board consisting of nine 
members, divided the state into nine districts, and created a three-
member district environmental commission for each district. The 
primary strength of Act 250 is the requirement that permits must 
be obtained for certain developments and land subdivisions. Permit 
applications are filed with the appropriate district commissioner, and 
a determination must be made that the project will not result in 
adverse effects on a number of criteria, including water and air 
*Candidate for M.A. in Historic Preservation Planning, Cornell University, 1987; M.S.L., 
Vermont Law School, 1983; J.D., Hamline University, 1976. 
1 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 701-791 (1978 & Supp. 1986). 
2 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §§ 4301-4494 (1975 & Supp. 1986). 
3 Pub. Act No. 250, 1969 Vt. Laws 237 (approved April 4, 1970; effective April 4, 1970 
except § 6, permit for development and subdivision, effective June 1, 1970); codified as 
amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1984 & Supp. 1986). 
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quality, soil stability, availability of educational services, and several 
others. Permits may also be issued subject to conditions to be met 
at a later date. 
Notable among the criteria is section 6086(a)(8) which provides, 
"(a) Before granting a permit, the board or district commission shall 
find that the subdivision or development: . . . (8) Will not have an 
undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty of the area, 
aesthetics, historic sites, or rare and irreplaceable natural areas."4 
Section 6001(9) defines an "Historic site" as "any site, structure, 
district, or archeological landmark which has been officially included 
in the National Register of Historic Places and/or the state register 
of historic places or which is established by testimony of the Vermont 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation as being historically sig-
nificant."5 Clearly, Act 250 was intended to protect Vermont's his-
toric sites as well as its environment. Further demonstration of this 
purpose is found in the Capability and Development Plan which was 
enacted to provide general and uniform policies on land use and 
development. Section 11 (Special Areas) provides in part: 
Lands that include or are adjacent to sites or areas of historical, 
educational, cultural, scientific, architectural or archeological 
value . . . should only be developed in a manner that will not 
significantly reduce that value of the site or area. Sites or areas 
which are in danger of destruction should be placed in whatever 
form of public or private ownership that would best maintain 
and utilize their value to the public. 6 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Act 250's effectiveness as 
a means of protecting Vermont's historic sites. Several flaws have 
emerged in sections of the Act that define its jurisdiction; much of 
the analysis concentrates on these flaws. Another area of weakness 
is the absence of criteria for measuring the effect of development on 
historic sites. A third concern is that certain parties have limited 
access to administrative and judicial review under Act 250, partic-
ularly before the Vermont Supreme Court. None of these flaws is 
so serious that it renders Act 250 completely ineffective at protecting 
historic properties, and none of these flaws is without potential 
remedy. Moreover, Act 250 has been a significant asset to historic 
preservation by providing a forum in which the expression of concern 
4 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(8) (1984). 
5 [d. at § 6001(9). 
6 Act of April 23, 1973, Pub. Act No. 85, § 7(a)(1l), 1973 Vt. Laws 246, 252; see VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 6042 (1984) (History of § 6042). 
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for historic sites can occur and in which effective negotiation can 
take place. 
In a national context, Act 250 can be utilized as a prototype by 
other states considering land use and development control at the 
state level. In this larger setting, it must be remembered that Act 
250 is designed to address a great number of complicated environ-
mental concerns and that its capacity to protect historic properties 
is only one of its many functions. However, if this type of broad 
legislation is to hold appeal for other states, each of its parts must 
work. The purpose then of this paper in such a national context is 
to suggest ways to carefully craft the legislation in order to make it 
effective at the task of protecting historic properties. 
II. JURISDICTION 
It should be noted at the outset that Act 250 attempts to address 
a vast number of environmental issues, many of which are quite 
complicated. Consequently, the extent to which Act 250 is able to 
protect historic sites may be shackled by the complex and sometimes 
ambiguous provisions of the Act which define its scope. Act 250 is 
intended to apply only to certain developments and subdivisions and 
establishes by definition those developments and subdivisions for 
which permits must be obtained. The Act provides several definitions 
of development in part as follows: 
"Development" means the construction of improvements on a 
tract or tracts of land, owned or controlled by a person, involving 
more than 10 acres of land within a radius of five miles of any 
point on any involved land, for commercial or industrial pur-
poses. "Development" shall also mean the construction of im-
provements for commercial or industrial purposes on more than 
one acre of land within a municipality which has not adopted 
permanent zoning and subdivision bylaws. The word "develop-
ment" shall mean the construction of housing projects such as 
cooperatives, condominiums, or dwellings, or construction or 
maintenance of mobile homes or trailer parks, with 10 or more 
units, constructed or maintained on a tract or tracts of land, 
owned or controlled by a person, within a radius of five miles of 
any point on any involved land. The word "development" shall 
not include construction for farming, logging, or forestry pur-
poses below the elevation of 2500 feet. The word "development" 
also means the construction of improvements on a tract of land 
involving more than 10 acres which is to be used for municipal 
or state purposes. In computing the amount of land involved, 
land shall be included which is incident to the use such as lawns, 
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parking areas, roadways, leaching fields and accessory build-
ings. 7 
Thus, there are numerous elements to the definition of develop-
ment, and the absence of anyone of these elements may result in 
the inapplicability of Act 250. 
A. Ten Acre Requirement 
Perhaps the most significant jurisdictional limitation facing those 
who would seek to use Act 250 to protect historic sites is the re-
quirement that improvements must involve more than ten acres in 
order to satisfy the definition of "development." The ten acre stan-
dard appears to have been an arbitrary one adopted as a means of 
designating projects which, because of their small size, do not have 
a substantial impact on values protected by Act 250. Quite simply, 
this rationale is incorrect when applied to projects that involve his-
toric sites. Such sites are frequently located on parcels of land 
smaller than ten acres,8 particularly in cities or town centers. In 
such a case, the size of the development project has little or no 
bearing on the potential for damage to these historic sites. The 
harshness of this situation is eased somewhat by the fact that sep-
arate parcels of land may be combined in order to satisfy the ten 
acre requirement. These standards for combining parcels are dis-
cussed in the following section. 
B. Involved Land 
What parcels of land should be included in the calculation of ten 
acres was the primary issue in Committee to Save the Bishop's 
House, Inc. v. Medical Center Hospital. 9 At the time of the case, 
Medical Center Hospital owned one of two noncontiguous parcels of 
land and leased the other. The first parcel, on which the hospital's 
7 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (1984). 
8 A survey of historic sites listed on the National Register of Historic Places in nine Vermont 
counties indicated that 80% of the sites were located on parcels of land smaller than ten acres. 
Of the remaining 20%, more than half were historic districts containing numerous buildings 
in town centers, most of which were on small parcels of land. Thus, 90% is a more accurate 
figure. Almost all of those sites located on parcels of land larger than ten acres were farms. 
There are approximately four thousand buildings in Vermont which are listed on the National 
Register of Historic Places. Buildings in historic districts are counted separately. There are 
approximately twenty-three thousand buildings which are currently listed on the Vermont 
Register of Historic Places, and the number is growing. 
9 137 Vt. 142, 400 A.2d 1015 (1979). 
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Mary Fletcher Unit was located, was 26.7 acres, and the second 
parcel, on which the DeGoesbriand Unit was located, was 5.9 acres. 
The Bishop's House was located on a 1.44 acre parcel of land adjoin-
ing the DeGoesbriand Unit parcel and was part of an historic district 
included in the National Register of Historic Places. 1o The Hospital 
sought to demolish the Bishop's House in order to construct a park-
ing lot, but an injunction against demolition was obtained from the 
Vermont Environmental Board. The Board ruled that Act 250 was 
applicable and that a permit was required for construction of the 
parking lot. Crucial to the Board's decision was the conclusion that 
the Mary Fletcher and DeGoesbriand Units were sufficiently inter-
related to justify adding the 26.7 acre parcel to the 5.9 acre parcel 
and 1.44 acre parcel on which the parking lot was to be built. 
The Vermont Supreme Court rejected Environmental Board Rule 
2(F) which defined "involved land"ll and stated: 
10 The Bishop's House, a frame house in the Italianate Style, was constructed between 1850 
and 1860 for John Sullivan Adams by the building firm of H. Roby and Brothers. From 1918 
to 1977, the house was used as the residence of the Bishops of the Burlington Diocese. See, 
Bishop's House File, Special Collections, Bailey-Howe Library, University of Vermont, Bur-
lington, Vt. The Bishop's House was listed as part of the University Green Historic District, 
University of Vermont Campus, Chittenden County, Vermont, effective Apri114, 1975. 44 
Fed. Reg. 7416, 7609 (1979). 
11 Environmental Board Rules are found at VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(F) 
(Oct. 9, 1973). At the time of the case, Rule 2(F) provided: 
"Involved land" includes all land within a radius of five miles which is part of, closely 
related or contiguous to or will or may be affected by the development, and which is 
owned or controlled by a person including but not liInited to, interests created by 
trusts, partnerships, corporations, contenancies, easements and contracts. 
The Vermont Supreme Court rejected Rule 2(F) as contrary to legislative intent and stated 
that "[i]t was the Legislature's intent to involve the state in land use decisions in cases where 
a permanent mechanism exists for their review at the municipal level only where activity on 
a very major scale is planned." 137 Vt. at 151, 400 A.2d at 1020. The court concluded that a 
liberal construction of ''involved land" would dilute the authority delegated to municipalities 
to regulate land use decisions by providing too frequent review at the state level. [d. at 152, 
400 A.2d at 1020. 
The court's concern for dual review at both the municipal and state levels seems to be an 
overriding one, and implicit in its decision.is the suggestion that this matter should have been 
resolved at the local level. However, the court's emphasis that regulation at the local level 
should not be diluted by frequent review at the state level is Inisleading and troublesome. 
Initially, Act 250 represents an acknowledgment that land use problems are regional issues 
and not just local issues. The state legislature attempted to define those situations where 
duplicate review was unnecessary by liIniting the jurisdiction of Act 250 and by specifically 
allowing state or municipal perInits to be used in lieu of evidence in order to satisfy the 
criteria in § 6086. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(d) (1984). Both § 6001(3) and § 6082 
demonstrate an intention on the part of the legislature to liInit the jurisdiction of Act 250. 
However, these sections cannot be isolated in support of the court's position. They must be 
read in conjunction with other provisions of the Act, some of which clearly indicate that Act 
250 was intended to cause review at both the state and municipal levels. 
\ 
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We conclude that land is involved within the meaning of 10 
V.S.A. § 6001(3) only where it is incident to the use within the 
meaning of that section, or where it bears some relationship to 
the land actually used in the construction of improvements, such 
that there is a demonstrable likelihood that the impact on the 
value sought to be protected by Act 250 will be substantially 
increased by reason of that relationship.12 
The court concluded that the land involved in actual construction, a 
1.44 acre parcel, did not bear a sufficient relationship to the 26.7 
acre parcel under this test and denied jurisdiction of Act 250. Al-
though the court acknowledged that use of the parking lot by the 
Mary Fletcher Unit might occur, it noted that the lot's primary 
purpose would be to serve the DeGoesbriand Unit. The court hinted 
that the parcel might be "involved land" within the court's nascent 
definition but noted that the combined size of the lots would fall 
short of ten acres. Unfortunately, few clues were offered to explain 
the lack of relationship between the 26.7 acre parcel and the 1.44 
acre parcel. 
Certainly the court's two-part definition of "involved land" nar-
rows the scope of Act 250. The court seems to state that it is the 
special relationship of separate parcels of land which must be the 
cause of a substantial increase in harm to values protected by Act 
250. Assume, for example, that the case had involved a proposal to 
demolish an historic building situated on a three acre parcel in order 
to build a parking lot for a nearby complex of stores located on a ten 
acre parcel. Assume also that the stores were located in an old mill 
which had been restored and that the building scheduled for demo-
lition had been part of the mill complex. Would the two parcels' 
common history sufficiently establish the special relationship needed 
to satisfy the court's test? We are left with little to guide us in 
evaluating the circumstances that might create such a special rela-
tionship, and the standard itself is somewhat vague. To further 
confuse the matter, the special relationship must be the cause of an 
increase in harm to a value protected by Act 250. In this example, 
Also troublesome is the potential for expansion of the court's language indicating that the 
legislature intended to involve the state in land use decisions only where activity is on a very 
major scale. This seems to place more emphasis on the size of the project rather than the 
12 137 Vt. at 153, 400 A.2d at 1021. Envtl. Bd. Rule 2(F) has been amended to conform to 
the court's definition, effective March ll, 1982. 
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would the loss of an historic building be a greater loss if that building 
is part of a complex of historic buildings? Again, few guidelines are 
provided to assist in the measurement of the harm created. This 
hypothetical serves to focus more clearly the new and complex stan-
dard that the special relationship of separate parcels be the cause of 
a substantial increase in the impact on a value protected by Act 250. 
Thus, the jurisdiction of Act 250 is made contingent, at least in 
part, upon a showing that a protected value will suffer an increase 
in damage as the result of this special relationship. It is arguable 
that the proximity of the Mary Fletcher and DeGoesbriand Units to 
the historic district in which the Bishop's House was located created 
a special relationship between the three parcels and that this spatial 
relationship created a potential harm to the historic district that was 
greater than the loss of a single building, for example the intrusion 
of a parking lot and an increase in traffic. The appellee Committee 
made the argument that the demolition of the Bishop's House would 
have an adverse effect on the historic district. In view of this, it is 
ironic that the court stated these allegations to be irrelevant to the 
issue of jurisdiction when, under the court's standard, they seem to 
bear directly on the issue. 13 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the case that in the future it will be 
more difficult to invoke the jurisdiction of Act 250 when separate 
parcels of land must be used to meet the ten acre requirement. As 
a result, efforts to use Act 250 to protect isolated historic sites on 
small parcels of land will be fettered. 
Separately, it should be noted that the definition of "involved land" 
changes when the project is part of a plan or larger undertaking. In 
that case, all land involved in the project is included. 14 
C. Commencement of Construction 
Of particular importance to historic preservation is the issue of 
whether the demolition of a building constitutes the commencement 
of construction, thus establishing the need for a permit. Environ-
mental Board Rule 2(C) provides: 
13 137 Vt. at 147, 400 A.2d at 1017-18. In their supreme court brief, appellee Committee 
raised the argument that construction of a parking lot would have an adverse effect on the 
historic district. However, they placed greater emphasis on the effect of the demolition of the 
Bishop's House. Under the court's test, perhaps it would be prudent to emphasize both 
arguments. 
14 VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(F)(3) (Oct. 9, 1973). 
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"Commencement of construction" means the construction of the 
first improvement on the land or to any structure or facility 
located on the land including work preparatory to construction 
such as clearing, the staking out or use of right-of-way or in any 
way incidental to altering the land according to a plan or inten-
tion to improve or to divide land by sale, lease or otherwise 
transfer an interest in the land. 15 
Environmental Board Rule 2(D) adds: 
"Construction of Improvements" means any activity which ex-
tends, modifies, or initiates any use of the land, other than that 
which is principally for the preparation of plans and specifications 
that may be required and necessary for making application for 
a permit, such as test-wells and pits, percolation tests, and line-
of-sight clearing for surveys, provided that no significant alter-
ation of the land and land cover will result [u]nless a District 
Environmental Commission or Board approves more extensive 
exploratory work. l6 
It would seem that, under these rules, when the demolition of a 
building is a necessary phase of an overall plan to improve the land, 
the demolition would qualify as commencement of construction. A 
different interpretation could produce the unfortunate result of al-
lowing a developer to raze a building or clear land before applying 
for a permit, and in so doing irreparably damage values protected 
by Act 250. The Vermont Supreme Court has addressed this issue 
and stated: "[d]emolition does not constitute the construction of 
improvements unless it is the first step in a proven development 
project."17 Thus, crucial under both rules 2(C) and 2(D) and the case 
law which has developed is the existence of a definite plan for con-
struction of an improvement. The absence of this element would 
certainly jeopardize the applicability of Act 250 when demolition of 
a building is contemplated. 
Whether or not a plan or project is definite enough to bring de-
molition within the definition of construction appears to be a question 
16 VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(C) (Oct. 9, 1973). The Environmental Board 
has interpreted this provision in Environmental Board Declaratory Ruling (hereinafter D.R.) 
No. 71 (Nov. 12, 1975) where they stated, "Construction of improvements means that there 
must be some physical change to the land, no matter how minimal, which initiates the 
development such as placement of stakes or clearing of brush." The D.R.s cited in this article 
are available at the Environmental Board's offices in the Vermont State Capital, Montpelier, 
Vermont. 
16 VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(D) (Oct. 9, 1973). This rule was stricken as 
overbroad in In re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. 68,444 A.2d 1349 (1982). The court reasoned 
that the definition would apply to any activity, a result not intended by Act 250. Id. at 92-93; 
444 A.2d at 1361. 
17 In re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. at 93,444 A.2d at 1362. 
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of fact. In In Re Agency of Administration, 18 the Vermont State 
Building Division sought to demolish an historic wood frame house 
in Montpelier. This house was part of the capitol complex historic 
district in Montpelier. The Environmental Board determined that 
the demolition was part of a proposed development plan referred to 
as the "Capitol Complex" and required a permit. The precise issue 
presented was whether, under.Environmental Board Rule 2(A)(4),19 
a sufficient plan or larger undertaking existed so as to justify the 
inclusion of other parcels of land as "involved land" and thus satisfy 
the ten acre jurisdictional requirement of Act 250. Based on the 
legislative history of Act 250, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded 
that development was activity which "achieved such finality of design 
that construction can be said to be ready to commence. "20 The court 
then interpreted "plan" to require the same degree of specificity and 
concreteness. The court then embarked on a lengthy review of the 
origins of the terms "Capitol Complex" and "Masterplan" as those 
terms were used to describe a study of the state government's office 
space requirements. Although the review traced a number of legis-
lative proposals for land acquisition, these proposals failed to provide 
specific details for planned acquisition and lacked legislative approval 
and funding. These factors led the court to conclude that the evidence 
did not support the position that a definite project existed, and to 
state that the studies amounted to only proposals, which were in-
sufficient to qualify as a plan. 21 Since no plan existed, demolition of 
the house did not constitute "construction of improvements," and 
thus did not require a permit. 
18 141 Vt. 68, 72, 444 A.2d 1349 (1982). 
19 Rule 2(A)(4) establishes a definition of development when improvements are made for 
state, county, or municipal purposes. It provides in part: 
In the case where a State or Municipal project is to be completed in stages according 
to a plan, or it is evident under the circumstances that a project is incidental to or a 
part of a larger undertaking, all land involved in the entire project shall be included 
for the purposes of determining jurisdiction. 
VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(A)(4) (Oct. 9, 1973). Presumably the definition of 
"plan" under Envtl. Bd. Rule 2(A)(4) is interchangeable with "plan" as used under Rule 2(C). 
20 141 Vt. at 79, 444 A.2d at 1354. 
21 In a dissent, Justice Billings argued for a broader interpretation of Rule 2(A)(4), noting 
that the activity must be part of a large undertaking. [d. at 97, 444 A.2d at 1364. He concluded 
that the "Capitol Complex" was more than a study, and that several acquisitions, demolitions, 
and constructions in furtherance of the plan had occurred. [d. at 97-98, 444 A.2d at 1364. 
Perhaps his most convincing argument is that frequently private developers must reassess 
aspects of a construction project at different phases and that the more complex process of 
reassessment inherent in government projects should not be a deciding factor. [d. at 99-100, 
444 A.2d at 1365. 
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It is difficult to predict the effect of this case on projects begun 
by private developers, who presumably do not face the numerous 
obstacles inherent in the political process. However, it is clear that 
courts will look very closely at the nature and status of the project 
when faced with this issue. It is also clear that Act 250 is not 
equipped to prevent demolition of an historic site when that demo-
lition is not part of a development plan or larger undertaking, or 
when the demolition occurs prior to the formulation of such a plan. 
Moreover, the burden of proving the existence of such a plan may 
be an onerous one if the developer is subdolous. 
D. Commercial Purposes 
The jurisdiction of Act 250 is also contingent upon the requirement 
that the improvements must be for commercial or industrial pur-
poses. Environmental Board Rule 2(L) defines "commercial purpose" 
as the term is used in § 6001(3) and provides that "'Commercial 
purpose' means the provision of facilities, goods or services by a 
person other than for a 'municipal or state purpose to others in 
exchange for payment of a purchase price, fee, contribution, donation 
or other object having value."22 Environmental Board Rule 2(M) 
adds: 
"Commercial dwelling" means any building or structure or part 
thereof, including but not limited to hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, nursing homes, dormitories and other places for the 
accommodation of people, that is intended to be used and occu-
pied for human habitation on a temporary or intermittent basis, 
in exchange for payment of a fee, contribution, donation or other 
object having value. The term does not include conventional 
residences, such as single family homes, duplexes, apartments, 
condominiums or vacation homes, occupied on a permanent or 
seasonal basis. 23 
The language in rules 2(L) and 2(M) is broad and appears to 
contemplate a wide variety of institutions, including both non-profit 
and profit-making organizations. The Vermont Supreme Court has 
adopted this interpretation unequivocally, reasoning that Act 250 
speaks to land use and not to the particular institutional activity 
associated with the land use.24 This point is an important one con-
22 VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(L) (June 24, 1974). 
23 VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(M). 
24 In re Baptist Fellowship of Randolph, Inc., 144 Vt. 636, 639, 481 A.2d 1274, 1276 (1984). 
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sidering the large number of historic properties owned by churches, 
hospitals, and universities. 
Rule 2(M) makes clear the point that dwellings such as hotels and 
apartments will be excluded from Act 250 jurisdiction if fewer than 
ten units are involved or if constructed for forestry, logging, or 
farming purposes below the elevation of 2500 feet. 
It should be noted briefly that additions or modifications to build-
ings used for commercial purposes might escape Act 250 jurisdiction 
if the additions themselves are not for commercial purposes. For 
example, the Environmental Board has ruled that a house addition 
to a motel complex was not for commercial purposes. 26 Furthermore, 
any additions or modifications must result in a substantial change to 
the existing building before a permit will be required.26 For example, 
permits were not required for a restaurant renovation that did not 
increase in seating capacity,27 and for office and garage additions to 
existing buildings.28 Certainly, minor additions or modifications to 
historic buildings can have a substantial impact on their historic 
value. The Environmental Board has been understandably cautious 
in its review of modifications to existing buildings, particularly in its 
interpretation of the "substantial change" test. However, to provide 
Act 250 with the expansive jurisdiction necessary to reach this type 
of project might create administrative disorder. This problem is 
probably best approached through local land use control rather than 
through state control. 
E. Municipal and State Projects 
One issue which frequently arises in the context of municipal and 
state projects is that of determining the amount of land involved in 
order to satisfy the ten acre requirement. Section 6001(3) provides 
that "In computing the amount of the land involved, land shall be 
included which is incident to the use such as lawns, parking areas, 
roadways, leaching fields and accessory buildings."29 It is not entirely 
clear whether this sentence modifies the sentence immediately pre-
2fi In D.R. 48 (Feb. 16, 1974) the Environmental Board ruled that a house addition to a 
motel complex was not for commercial puposes. 
26 See VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(A)(5) (Oct. 9,1973). For example, in 
D.R. 10 (May 6, 1973), no permit was required for a restaurant renovation with no increase 
in seating capacity. In D.R. 36 (Oct. 31, 1973), no permit was required for office and garage 
additions to existing buildings. . 
2'7 D.R. 10 (May 6, 1973). 
28 D.R. 36 (Oct. 31, 1973). 
29 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3). 
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ceding it, which contains the definition of "development" for munic-
ipal and state purposes, or whether it applies to the term "involved 
land" as it is used throughout section 6001(3). Certainly the more 
logical explanation is that it applies only to municipal and state 
projects. This interpretation would provide a solution to the problem 
faced by municipalities as the result of their extensive land holdings. 
Highways and other non-incident land would not be included in 
calculating the ten acres, and permits would be required less fre-
quently. The State Environmental Board has summarized the issue 
succinctly, declaring "Had the legislature not made this distinction, 
practically every state and municipal project would come under the 
jurisdiction of Act 250 because the amount of related land within a 
five mile radius that is owned or controlled by these political entities 
would be more than 10 acres."30 Nevertheless, this ambiguity could 
be removed by proper draftsmanship. 
Consequently, the jurisdiction of Act 250 over municipal and state 
projects rests upon a two-part analysis. First, the land used to 
satisfy the ten acre requirement must be incident to the project use, 
pursuant to Section 6001(3) and Environmental Board Rule 2(A)(4). 
Second, the special relationship-substantial impact test established 
in Committee to Save the Bishop's House, Inc. v. Medical Center 
Hospital presumably must be met. 31 While the first test is ambigu-
ous, the second test appears broad enough to encompass the first. 
Consequently, historic buildings within the path of municipal or state 
projects are no less vulnerable to the quirks of Act 250 jurisdiction 
than are those in the path of private development. 
The absence of Act 250 jurisdiction over certain state projects, 
however, does not affect the responsibility of heads of state agencies 
to consult directly with the Vermont Division for Historic Preser-
vation when state projects have an adverse effect on historic sites. 32 
Moreover, to the extent that federal funding is involved in any 
projects, state or otherwise, it will be necessary for the heads of the 
appropriate federal agencies to afford the National Advisory Council 
on Historic Preservation opportunity to comment on the effect of 
30 D.R. 42 (Jan. 29, 1979). Envtl. Bd. Rule 2(A)(4), is consistent with this interpretation. 
See supra note 19. However, in Committee to Save the Bishop's House Inc. v. Medical Center 
Hospital, 137 Vt. 142, 400 A.2d 1015 (1979), the court seemed to rely on these examples of 
''involved land" in its search for a definition of that term. They failed to address the inherent 
ambiguity in the Act, and the effect of their opinion is unclear. 
31 137 Vt. 142, 400 A.2d 1015 (1979). For a discussion of this test, see supra notes 8-13 and 
accompanying text. 
32 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 742-743 (1978 & Supp. 1986). 
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the project on any historic sites.33 In addition, the appropriate 
agency official is also required to consult the state historic preser-
vation officer to determine what historic sites are known to be within 
the area of the undertaking. 34 
F. Subdivisions 
Act 250 also requires permits for certain subdivisions and defines 
the types of subdivisions for which permits must be obtained: 
"Subdivision" means a tract or tracts ofland, owned or controlled 
by a person, which have been partitioned or divided for the 
purpose of resale into 10 or more lots within a radius of five 
miles of any point on any lot, and within any continuous period 
of 10 years after the effective date of this chapter. In determining 
the number of lots, a lot shall be counted if any portion is within 
five miles. 35 
Section 6001(11) adds that "Lot" means "any undivided interest in 
land, whether freehold or leasehold, including but not limited to 
interests created by trusts, partnerships, corporations, cotenancies 
and contracts."36 By definition, a subdivision does not fall within Act 
250 jurisdiction unless there are ten or more lots, and to the extent 
subdivisions of fewer than ten lots have an adverse impact on historic 
sites, the problem must be addressed at the local level. 37 
III. CRITERIA FOR HISTORIC SITES 
According to the terms of section 6086(a)(8), the environmental 
board or a district commission may not issue a permit for a proposed 
development or subdivision if the proposal will have an undue ad-
33 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1982). 
S4 36 C.F.R. § SOO.4(a)(I) (1986). 
35 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(19) (1984). 
36 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(11) (1984) The definition of "lot" under this section is 
ambiguous. The term ''undivided interest" has meaning only when it is used to describe the 
separate ownership of a parcel of land by more than one person, each owner with the right 
to possess and use the whole. The need for Act 250 to deal with undivided interests is not 
questioned. However, as Section 6001(11) is drafted, it fails to apply to anything but undivided 
interests. A possible definition is: "Lot means any interest, undivided or otherwise, in land 
.... " Envtl. Bd. Rule 2(J) contains a similar ambiguous definition. VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo 
ENVTL. Bn. R. 2(J) (Oct. 9, 1973). 
37 As originally enacted, Section 6001(11) provided that areas of land larger than ten acres 
were not considered to be lots. Thus, if all but nine of the lots were larger than ten acres, a 
subdivision did not exist, and Act 250 did not apply. This lacuna was closed by an amendment 
enacted in 1983. 
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verse effect on historic sites.38 An initial question, then, concerns 
the definition of historic site. Section 6001(9) defines an historic site 
as one which is listed on the National or State Register of Historic 
Places, or one established as historically significant by the Vennont 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.39 Neither Act 250 nor 
the Vennont Historic Preservation Act40 furnishes a precise defini--
tion of the tenn "historically significant." In order to support the 
conclusion that a site is historically significant, the Advisory Com-
mittee would presumably rely on the criteria used in determining 
eligibility for the National or State Register of Historic places.41 Any 
uncertainty about the authority to rely on these criteria could be 
resolved by expanding the definition in section 6001(9) to include 
those sites that are eligible for inclusion in the National Historic 
Preservation Act, which requires the heads of federal agencies to 
consider the effects of federal or federally assisted projects on sites 
included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. To the 
extent the criteria established pursuant to the National Historic 
Preservation Act are insufficient to protect sites that are ineligible 
for the National or State Registers, the broad language of section 
6001(9) might be used to provide an additional measure of protection. 
A second point is the fact that the burden of proving that the 
issuance of a development or subdivision permit will have no undue 
adverse effect on historic sites is on the party opposing the appli-
cant.42 Consequently, historic preservation groups which have 
cleared the jurisdiction and standing hurdles must be prepared to 
overcome the statutory presumption in favor of the applicant. 
The lack of any objective standards by which the district commis-
sioners and the environmental board are able to judge whether a 
proposed development or subdivision has an undue adverse effect 
on historic sites is, however, one of the most critical areas of concern 
in judging Act 250's effectiveness. This problem is obscured in cases 
such as Committee to Save the Bishop's House, Inc. v. Medical 
38 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(8) (1984). 
39 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(9) (1984). 
40 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 701-791 (1978 & Supp. 1986). The definitions under this act 
provide that "'Historic Property' or 'resource' means any building, structure, object, district, 
area or site that is significant in the history, architecture, archeology, or culture of this state, 
its communities or the nation." [d. § 701(6). 
41 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 723(a)(2) (Supp. 1986) (Duties and powers of division) provides: 
"(a) The division shall . . . (2) Adopt standards for the listing of an historic property on the 
state register consistent with the standards of the National Register and the relevant federal 
standards of preservation and care." 
42 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6043 (repealed 1983, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.) § 5). 
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Center Hospital43 and In re Agency of Administration,44 where few 
would argue that demolition does not have an undue adverse effect 
on an historic building. However, it surfaces when disputes arise 
concerning the compatibility of proposed developments with existing 
historic sites or districts. These disputes strain the ability of the 
subjective standard "undue adverse effect" to withstand attack with-
out objective standards to serve as reinforcements. Moreover, in any 
context the term "undue" is a vague and somewhat strict standard, 
and it has been suggested that the term "unavoidable" might be a 
more appropriate standard. 45 
The danger which the absence of objective standards poses is that 
permit applications will be treated in an inconsistent manner by 
district commissioners when issues involving historic sites are in-
volved. For example, what, if any, restrictions should be placed on 
building width and height, facade rhythm and proportions, doors, 
porches, windows, signs, roof styles and direction, or even building 
color in order to improve compatibility of proposed buildings with 
nearby historic buildings or districts. The inconsistent application of 
such restrictions could encourage constitutional challenge to section 
6086(8). This challenge would probably have as a foundation argu-
ment that, absent proper guidelines, section 6086(8) is an improper 
delegation of legislative authority.46 Crucial to this argument is the 
failure of the Vermont Legislature to adopt the state land use plan 
required by Act 250. 47 The state plan would have established broad 
categories for the proper use of land and would have guided the 
coordinated and efficient development of the state. Among other 
things, the state plan was to have encouraged local participation 
through regional and town plans, and through zoning and subdivision 
regulations. 48 Without the consistent and uniform guidelines in-
tended for this state plan, district commissioners face great uncer-
43 137 Vt. 142, 400 A.2d 1015 (1979) . 
.. 141 Vt. 68, 444 A.2d 1349 (1982). 
45 In a March, 1983 interview with Mr. Eric Gilbertson, Director of the Vermont Division 
for Historic Preservation, Mr. Gilbertson made the suggestion that the term ''unavoidable'' 
would be a more appropriate standard and would be in conformity with the National Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation concerning methods of avoiding, mitigating, or minimizing 
adverse effects caused by agency projects. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4 (1986). 
46 For an analysis of possible constitutional arguments and additional citations concerning 
§ 6086(a)(8) of Act 250, see Note, Leaving the Scene: Aesthetic Considerations in Act 250, 4 
VT. L. REV. 163 (1979). 
47 In 1983, the legislature repealed former section 6043, which required adoption of a state 
land use plan. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6043 (1984). 
48 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6088 (1984). 
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tainty in applying the criteria of section 6086. While this may trans-
late into an improper delegation of legislative authority, there are 
several arguments which can be used to answer such a challenge. 
The best argument against the improper delegation challenge is 
based on the authority that the Vermont Advisory Council on His-
toric Preservation has been given to participate in the review of 
permit applications. Section 742(a)(8) of the Vermont Historic Pre-
servation Act provides that "(a) The council shall ... Advise on any 
participation in the review of federal, federally assisted, and feder-
ally licensed undertakings that may affect historic properties and 
sites; and approve any participation in the review of non-federal 
undertakings, but not limited to proceedings under the state land 
use and development act. "49 As a result, the district commissioners 
and environmental board have a well qualified resource to which 
they can turn for advice on matters involving historic buildings and 
districts, thus reducing the chance of inconsistent application of the 
permit process. While the adoption of a state land use plan appears 
unlikely, perhaps a politically more palatable solution is to amend 
section 723 of the Vermont Historic Preservation Act and vest the 
Division for Historic Preservation with the authority to establish 
compatibility standards and criteria for proposed development. 50 The 
final decision would be left to the district commissioners or the 
environmental board, but uniform standards would be adopted. 
Second, where historic district zoning, formerly referred to as 
design control districts in Vermont, does exist, the design review 
criteria should be used by the district commissioners to aid in the 
process of considering the compatibility of new development. The 
absence of local land use planning in Vermont is a serious handicap, 
particularly so because of the current absence of uniform standards 
at the state level. The Village of Woodstock is an excellent example 
of a municipality in Vermont which has adopted a zoning ordinance 
which incorporates compatibility standards. 51 
49 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 742(a)(8) (Supp. 1986). 
50 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 723(6), (1978) (Duties and powers of division) could be used as 
a model for this proposal; it provides that "(a) The division shall, and where required by 
section 742 of this title, with the approval of the advisory council on historic preservation (b) 
Establish standards and criteria for the acquisition of historic properties and for the preser-
vation, restoration, maintenance and operation of properties under the control of the division." 
Id. 
51 Woodstock Zoning Ordinance, Article IV, § 4.104 (Criteria for Approval). The ordinance 
includes design standards which address a number of issues including height, setback, pro-
portion, pattern, materials, architectural features, continuity, direction of front facade, and 
roof shape. 
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Third, the Capability and Development Plan has defined the am-
biguous "undue adverse effect" standard by providing that devel-
opment near historic sites should not significantly reduce the value 
of that site. While the Capability and Development Plan may not be 
used as criteria, it may be used to help interpret the criteria in 
section 6086.52 This may be a difficult path to take, however, when 
the valuation of historic properties is troublesome. 
Finally, the fact that permits may be issued subject to conditions 
is a tool which should not be overlooked. 63 To some extent, it may 
be necessary for district commissioners to recognize the weakness 
inherent in this section of Act 250 and to obtain concessions through 
the process of negotiation whenever possible. While this alternative 
does not encourage uniform application of standards, it nevertheless 
provides a forum for negotiation where compromise can be reached 
in lieu of expensive litigation. 
To reiterate, Act 250's ability to protect historic properties could 
be improved by more clearly defining the term "historic site," by 
changing the "undue adverse effect" standard to an "unavoidable 
adverse effect" standard, and by transferring the burden of proof of 
adverse effect onto the permit applicant. The weakness created by 
the absence of criteria needed to measure adverse effect is a serious 
one. If a legislative remedy is not possible, then district commis-
sioners should utilize the resources provided by the Vermont Divi-
sion for Historic Preservation, rely on local plans and historic district 
zoning when they exist, apply the Capability and Development Plan 
when possible, and resort to negotiated permit conditions if all else 
fails. 
IV. STANDING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PERMIT PROCESS 
A vital test of Act 250's effectiveness as a means of protecting 
Vermont's historic properties is the extent to which the Act is ac-
cessible to parties who desire to protect these properties. Unfortu-
nately, the rules governing standing are complex, and special inter-
est organizations and adjoining landowners have limited access to 
judicial review, particularly before the Vermont Supreme Court. 
Consequently, the Vermont Division for Historic Preservation must 
be prepared to intervene in appropriate cases. 
62 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9) (1984); In re Pyramid Co., No. 559-78 CnM (Chit-
tenden Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 1980). 
63 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(c) (1984). 
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The initial application for a permit is heard before a district com-
mission. Section 6085(c) establishes the proper parties at this hearing 
and provides in part that "Parties shall be those who have received 
notice, adjoining property owners who have requested a hearing and 
such other persons as the board may allow by rule."54 Environmental 
Board Rule 14(A) identifies statutory parties entitled to party status 
to include affected state agencies, municipalities, municipal and re-
gional planning commissions, and other appropriate parties who re-
ceive notice. 55 In addition, Rule 14(B) provides: 
Permitted parties. The Board or a district commission may allow 
as parties to a proceeding individuals or groups not otherwise 
accorded party status by statute upon written or oral petition if 
it finds that the petitioner has adequately demonstrated: (l)That 
a proposed development or subdivision may affect his interest 
under any of the provisions of section 6086(a); or (2) That his 
participation will materially assist the board or commission by 
providing testimony, cross-examining witnesses, and/or offering 
other evidence relevant to the provisions of section 6086(a).56 
Crucial to the right to party status under rule 14(B) is a showing 
that the development or subdivision would affect an interest pro-
tected by the criteria in section 6086(a), or that the participation 
would materially assist the board or commission. Under this provi-
sion, it appears that the district commissioners are granted wide 
discretion in conferring party status at the permit application hear-
ing. Hopefully, organizations such as the Committee to Save the 
Bishop's House, Inc. would be granted party status. 
However, access to administrative review of the district commis-
sion's decision by the state environmental board is more complicated 
for adjoining property owners and Rule 14(B) parties. As originally 
enacted, section 6089(a) provided in part: 
[A]n appeal from the district commission shall be to the board. 
An appeal under this section may be removed by the applicant 
54 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6085(c)(1984). Parties to whom notice must be sent under Act 
250 are: (1) The municipality and municipal and regional planning commission where the land 
is located; (2) adjacent Vermont municipalities or commissions if the land is located on a 
municipal boundary; (3) state agencies directly affected; and (4) other municipalities, state 
agencies, or persons the district deems appropriate. [d. § 6084. Pursuant to Envtl. Bd. Rule 
14(A)(4), parties who receive notice marked "For Information Only" are not accorded party 
status. 
65 Envtl. Bd. Rule 14(a) (copies available at the Vt. Envtl. Bd., Montpelier, Vt.). 
56 Envtl. Bd. Rule 14(b) (copies available at the Vt. Envtl. Bd., Montpelier, Vt.). 
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to the superior court of the county in which any real estate of 
the applicant . . . is located. 57 
19 
A 1985 amendment to section 6089, however, eliminated the right of 
removal to superior court from the environmental board. Section 
6085(c) clarifies the parties who are entitled to appeal: 
For the purposes of appeal only the applicant, a state agency, 
the regional and municipal planning commissions and the munic-
ipalities required to receive notice shall be considered parties. 
An adjoining property owner may participate in hearings and 
present evidence only to the extent the proposed development 
or subdivision will have a direct effect on his property under 
section 6086(a) .... 58 
Environmental Board Rule 40(A) provides: "Any party aggrieved 
by an adverse determination by a district commission may appeal to 
the board ... , and will be given a de novo hearing on findings of 
the commission. "59 
An apparent discrepancy exists between section 6085(c) and rule 
40(A). Under 6085(c), adjoining landowners are limited to review of 
the issue of the effect of the development on the adjoining property. 
Review is not granted to rule 14(B) parties. On the other hand, Rule 
40(A) grants review to all aggrieved parties and no special limitation 
is placed on adjoining property owners. The resolution of this dis-
crepancy can be found in two cases which have dealt with party 
status under Act 250. 
The first of these cases, In re Preseault,60 dealt with an applicant's 
appeal to the environmental board and request for a de novo hearing 
after a district commission denied the applicant's permit request. 
Adjoining landowners who participated at the district commission 
hearings were denied the right to participate before the environ-
mental board. At the time of the case, section 6085(c) made no 
provision for appeal by adjoining landowners. The Vermont Supreme 
Court held that the adjoining landowners had the right to appear as 
parties before the environmental board, reasoning that a de novo 
proceeding is one in which all the evidence is considered without 
reference to an earlier proceeding and is one which contemplates 
participation by the original parties. 61 
57 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6089(a) (Supp. 1986). 
58 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6085(c) (1984). 
69 Envtl. Bd. Rule 40(A) (copies available at the Vt. Envtl. Bd., Montpelier, Vt.). 
60 130 Vt. 343, 292 A.2d 832 (1972). 
61 Id. at 348-49, 292 A.2d at 835--36. 
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In In Re George F. Adams Co. ,62 this rule was probably extended 
to rule 14(B) parties admitted at the discretion of a district commis-
sion and to both adjoining landowners and rule 14(B) parties who 
formerly sought de novo appeal before a superior court.63 The Ver-
mont Supreme Court distinguished between appeals from the district 
commissions to the environmental board or from the district com-
missions to superior court for purposes of a de novo hearing, and 
appeals from either the environmental board or superior court to 
the Vermont Supreme Court. Although the issue before the court 
involved only the appeal of rule 14(B) parties to the Vermont Su-
preme Court, the opinion attempted to clarify the matter by pointing 
out that appeals to either the environmental board or superior court 
were factfinding proceedings and hence were proper forums for all 
parties. The 1985 amendment to section 6089 now confines this opin-
ion to appeals before the environmental board. 
Subsequent to Preseault, section 6085(c) was amended to its pres-
ent form to restrict the scope of review granted to adjoining land-
owners.64 Rule 40(A) reflects the guidelines set by these cases, ap-
parently in disregard of the limitation on adjoining landowners 
imposed by the statutory amendment. Consequently, access at the 
district commission and environmental board levels is available to a 
wide range of parties. Unquestionably, the vital bridge to partici-
pation at this level by historic preservation groups is rule 14(B). 
Participation by such groups and by adjoining landowners beyond 
this level, however, has been limited. Section 6089(b), as amended 
in 1985, provides: "An appeal from a decision of the board under 
subsection (a) shall be to the supreme court by a party as set forth 
in section 6085(c) of this title."65 The first case to interpret section 
6085(c) subsequent to its amendment in 1973 was In Re Wildlife 
62 134 Vt. 172, 174,353 A.2d 576, 577 (1976)(dicta). 
63 It should be noted that this issue was not directly before the Vermont Supreme Court 
and the pertinent language should be considered as dicta only. See id. The precise holding of 
the case is that under Act 250, Rule 14(B) parties (then Rule 12(C» do not have the right to 
appeal to the supreme court from the environmental board or superior court. [d. at 174-75, 
353 A.2d at 577. The case does not consider possible rights under the Vermont Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
64 The 1973 amendment added the language, "An adjoining property owner may participate 
in hearings and present evidence only to the extent the proposed development or subdivision 
will have a direct effect on his property under section 6086(a)(I) through (a)(IO) of this title." 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6085(c) (1984). 
66 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6089(b) (Supp. 1986). Envtl. Bd. Rule 40(E) provides: "Any 
party aggrieved by an adverse determination of the board may appeal to the Vermont Supreme 
Court under the provisions of Chapter 102 of Title 12 V.S.A." 
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Wonderland, Inc. 66 In that case, the supreme court held that section 
6085(c), as amended, modified the party status granted by Preseault 
to adjoining landowners for de novo appeal before the environmental 
board. The court concluded that adjoining landowners are considered 
to be participators, not parties, and are not entitled to appeal to the 
supreme court under section 6089(b).67 
Then, in InRe GeorgeF. Adams & Co., 68 a party who participated 
in hearings before a district commission or the environmental board 
pursuant to Rule 14(B) was denied standing to appeal to the Vermont 
Supreme Court. The court interpreted section 6085(c) narrowly to 
permit appeal to the supreme court only for the applicant, a state 
agency, regional and municipal planning commissions, and munici-
palities receiving notice. 
These two cases make it clear that Act 250 alone does not provide 
access to appellate review at the supreme court level for any parties 
other than those identified in section 6085(c). To the extent that 
adjoining property owners and rule 14(B) parties desire to seek 
review before the Vermont Supreme Court, they must rely on the 
Vermont Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to do SO.69 Section 
6002 of Act 250 provides that the Vermont AP A applies to proce-
dures under Act 250 unless the latter specifically states otherwise. 70 
V. ACT 250 AS A FORUM FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
It is unfortunate that the two major cases, Committee to Save the 
Bishop's House, Inc. v. Medical Center Hospital71 and In re Agency 
66 133 Vt. 507, 346 A.2d 645 (1975). 
f{1Id. at 518-19, 346 A.2d at 652. 
68 134 Vt. 172, 353 A.2d 576 (1976). 
69 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 801-849 (1985). 
70 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6002 (1984). Section 815(a) of the Vennont APA provides "A 
person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is 
aggrieved by a final decision in any contested case may appeal that decision to the supreme 
court .... " VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 815(a) (1985). Thus, in order to invoke the Vennont 
APA, an adjoining landowner or Rule 14(B) party must exhaust all administrative remedies 
and be an aggrieved party. In In Re Great E. Bldg. Co., 132 Vt. 610, 613-14, 326 A.2d 152, 
154 (1974), the Vennont Supreme Court acknowledged the similarity between the Vennont 
APA and Section 10 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, and the court seemed to 
adopt the standards established by federal cases which have interpreted Section 10 of the 
Federal APA. For a thorough analysis of the issues concerning applicability of the Vennont 
AP A to Act 250 and other issues pertaining to party status, including improper delegation of 
legislative authority, See Note, Party Status and Standing Under Vermont's Land Use and 
Development Law (Act 250), 2 VT. L. REV. 163 (1977). 
71 137 Vt. 142, 400 A.2d 1015 (1979). For a discussion of Bishop's House, see supra notes 
8-13 and accompanying text. 
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of Administration, 72 which defined the perimeters of Act 250 juris-
diction, involved historic properties. Perhaps it is unfair to evaluate 
Act 250's effectiveness in terms of historic preservation on these 
cases alone. Both cases leave one with the impression that the Ver-
mont Supreme Court is concerned with the extent to which Act 250 
infringes upon private property interests that might be more 
properly controlled at the local level. In short, these cases should 
be evaluated in terms of the effectiveness of a land use permit system 
at the state level, not just in terms of historic preservation. In spite 
of these setbacks, Act 250 continues to provide a major asset to 
historic preservation by establishing a forum in which the concern 
for historic sites can be effectively expressed. 
For example, a land use permit was issued for the renovation of 
the American Woolen Company Mill in Winooski into 147 apartments 
and additional office, commercial, and recreational space. A finding 
was made that no adverse effect on the historic building would occur 
because only minor exterior changes would be made, and proper 
exterior treatment techniques would be used. 73 In such cases, the 
developers have the opportunity to work closely with the Vermont 
Division for Historic Preservation, and design and preservation is-
sues can be discussed and resolved. 
In St. Albans, a developer proposed to construct a shopping center 
on land owned by the Central Vermont Railway known as the 
"Switchyard." The site at one time contained twelve buildings listed 
on the National Register of Historic Places. 74 A land use permit was 
issued by the District VI Commission allowing the shopping center 
plan to proceed on the conditions that an appraisal of potential 
adaptive use be made, that design plans for restoration be drafted, 
and that preparation work not jeopardize the historic value of the 
site. The permit also authorized the demolition of a locomotive fab-
rication and repair shop. Subsequent to the demolition of that build-
ing, a request was made by the developer to amend the permit to 
allow demolition of a two story tower which had adjoined the loco-
motive repair shop. This request was denied by the District Com-
mission, but the Environmental Board overruled the Commission 
and amended the permit to authorize demolition. The Board rea-
72 141 Vt. 68, 444 A.2d 1349 (1982). For a discussion of Agency of Admin., see supra notes 
17-20 and accompanying text. 
73 Land Use Permit 4C0418, State Environmental Board Office, Montpelier, Vt. 
74 Central Vermont Railroad Headquarters, Franklin County, Vermont; listed effective Jan. 
21, 1974. 44 Fed. Reg. 7416, 7609 (1979). 
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soned that while demolition would have an adverse effect, it was not 
an undue adverse effect because without the locomotive shop the 
tower had no independent historic significance. 75 While it is unfor-
tunate that demolition for the repair shop, a decision opposed by the 
Division for Historic Preservation, occurred and led to the demolition 
of the tower, the permit process did provide an opportunity to thor-
oughly review the impact of the development on the historic sites. 
In addition, some of the other buildings were restored. 
In 1970, the Vermont Department of Forests and Parks purchased 
property to be used in the development of Knight's Point State Park, 
and an application for a land use permit required by Act 250 was 
made. The Knight's Tavern, a building constructed in 1845 in the 
Greek Revival Style, was located on the property, and a permit was 
issued subject to the condition that the building's exterior integrity 
be maintained. A wing of the building was subsequently demolished 
in violation of the permit, and the environmental board ordered its 
reconstruction. 76 
Other cases have made it clear that state agencies, too, must 
comply with the requirements of Act 250. In 1973, the Vermont 
Agency of Transportation was held to be within the purview of Act 
250 jurisdiction. The Agency had sought to construct an access road 
to Brookfield, a small village with an unpaved main street, now an 
historic district listed on the National Register of Historic Places. 77 
It is clear from these cases that Act 250 is a medium for thoughtful 
analysis of the impact of development on historic sites. The Vermont 
Division for Historic Preservation has been capable in its advisory 
capacity when development has threatened Vermont's historic prop-
erties. Although some buildings have been lost, the impact of the 
development has been clearly assessed, the buildings themselves 
documented, and sincere efforts made at retaining the historic in-
tegrity of the building. This is one of the strengths of Act 250. 
VI. PERMITS FOR ADAPTIVE USE AND RESTORATION 
A compiete evaluation of Act 250 from the perspective of historic 
preservation perforce must discuss the fact that attempts to save 
75 Land Use Permit 6F0192, and Land Use Permit Amendments 6F0192-1 and 6F0192-1-
EB, State Environmental Board Office, Montpelier, Vt. 
76 D.R. 77, Sept. 8, 1976; Land Use Permit 6G0062, State Environmental Board Office, 
Montpelier, Vt. 
77 D.R. 21, July 25, 1973. Brookfield Village Historic District, Orange County, Vermont; 
listed effective March 24, 1978; 44 Fed. Reg. 7609, 7614 (1979). 
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historic buildings may trigger Act 250 jurisdiction, thus requiring a 
permit. Acquisition of a permit is contingent upon satisfactory com-
pliance with all the criteria enumerated in section 6086(a)(1) to (10).78 
This circumstance is most likely to occur when historic buildings are 
adapted to apartment or condominium use. Such a project will be 
considered to be a development if ten or more units are involved. 79 
Similarly, if the project is large, involves ten or more acres, and is 
for commercial or industrial purposes, a permit will also be required. 
It should be noted that the ten acre requirement is reduced to one 
acre in municipalities without zoning and subdivision laws. 
Furthermore, permits will be required for substantial changes to 
existing buildings which at the time of their construction would have 
been subject to Act 250 jurisdiction. Environmental Board Rule 
2(A)(5) provides the following definition of development: "Any con-
struction of improvements which will make a substantial change or 
addition to or expansion of an existing development over which the 
Board has jurisdiction or in an existing development that would have 
been subject to Board jurisdiction .... "80 
The "substantial change" standard is a broad one, but the factor 
which seems most critical is the potential impact of the change on 
the protected criteria.81 Certainly, any major work on historic build-
ings has an impact on the historic value of that building. An inter-
esting and unanswered question is whether interior adaptive uses 
have a less significant impact than do exterior modifications. In other 
words, if the exterior of an historic building is left unchanged, but 
massive interior modifications are made, has there been a substantial 
change? Usually, concern for exterior changes is paramount, and the 
interior can be modified to meet adaptive reuse. However, on occa-
sion the interior of a building can be historically significant, and it 
is reassuring that the language here may be broad enough to address 
this need. 
VII. ACT 250 IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT 
Vermont is one of only a few states to have enacted legislation 
controlling land use and development at the state level. Each of the 
78 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a) (1984 & Supp. 1986). 
79 VT. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 6001(3) (1984); see supra text accompanying note 7. 
80 VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMPo ENVTL. BD. R. 2(a)(5) (Oct. 9, 1973). 
81 D.R. 85, Nov. 8, 1977. The District Commission stated: 
In short, the Board in weighing substantiality looks not only at the size of the existing 
land use and the incremental size of the change, but at the overall environment in 
which the use takes place, and the potential for impact under the criteria set forth 
in detail under section 6086(a). ld. 
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several states has chosen a different approach to land use control, 
but each state incorporates into their legislation, to some degree, 
the capacity to protect historic properties. 
There would be little value to placing this narrow evaluation of a 
single function of Act 250 into a national context for the sole purpose 
of measuring Act 250's ability to protect historic properties against 
the different approaches conceived in other states. A state's decision 
to implement a particular form of land use control will hinge on 
concerns much broader than just historic preservation. Moreover, 
political, social, and geographic peculiarities within a state may ren-
der some of the options impractical. 
Instead, there is merit in briefly explaining how other states have 
chosen to approach the matter of land use control at the state level 
and how that legislation has included means of protecting historic 
properties. Within this context, then, it would also be useful to 
reiterate how Vermont's particular style of legislation can be more 
carefully crafted to protect historic sites. 
In 1961, Hawaii became the first state to enact statewide zoning. 82 
A state land use commission was created, and four categories of land 
were established: urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation.83 A 
1983 amendment added a category for geothermal resource sub-
zones. 84 Conservation areas included scenic and historic sites. 
Amendments to district boundaries and special permits for unusual 
uses within districts can be obtained by petition to the land use 
commission.85 Although administration of zoning regulations within 
the districts occurs at the county level pursuant to a comprehensive 
statewide land use plan, conservation districts were placed under 
the supervision of the department of land and natural resources. 86 
Thus, in Hawaii historic properties are protected through a state 
zoning mechanism. 
Oregon, in contrast, created a state Land Conservation and De-
velopment Commission and vested it with the authority to coordinate 
a statewide system of comprehensive land use plans. 87 To this end, 
the commission was authorized to prepare goals intended to govern 
land use decisions, and each city and county was required to prepare 
a plan conforming to these goals. 88 Goal "five" included protection of 
82 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to 205-37 (1985). 
83 [d. §§ 205-1 & 205-2. 
84 HAW. REV. STAT. § 205-5.1 (1985). 
85 [d. §§ 205-3, 205-4, & 205-6. 
86 [d. § 205-5(a). 
87 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.30-.45 (1985). 
88 [d. at §§ 197.040(2)(a) & .175(2)(a). 
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scenic and historic areas. The land use commission was also given 
the responsibility for hearing appeals from the land use decisions at 
the city and county level. This responsibility was later transferred 
to the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals.89 The primary focus of 
Oregon's legislation is a uniform statewide system of planning ad-
ministered at the county level. Protection of historic properties is 
accomplished through local zoning ordinances. 
Neither Oregon nor Hawaii relies on the permit system which is 
the backbone of Act 250. On the other hand, Vermont has failed to 
enact a comprehensive state land use plan similar to that used in 
Oregon. Florida offers a slightly different approach and utilizes the 
permit system in a somewhat restricted manner. The Florida En-
vironment Land and Water Management Act of 1972 attempts to 
regulate development within areas of critical state concern by re-
quiring permits for major development.90 Areas of critical state con-
cern may be designated for a variety of reasons including important 
historic or archeological sites. 91 Florida and Vermont share a similar 
struggle at defining the type of development to include within the 
permit process, but Florida has taken a significant step toward 
protecting historic properties by including the demolition of a struc-
ture in the definition of development. 92 However, Florida's legislation 
is aimed at isolating specific areas of major concern rather than 
incorporating the entire state into a system of land use control and 
selecting certain types of development which need to be reviewed. 
Although Act 250 resembles in part some of the legislation which 
exists in Oregon and Florida, it is distinct in its inclusion of the 
entire state within a permit review process and its division of the 
state into administrative regions. Other states considering a similar 
approach will face many of the issues with which Vermont is cur-
rently struggling. Issues such as jurisdiction (determining what type 
of development to place within the review process), criteria (stan-
dards by which impact of development is measured), or standing 
(deciding whom to include in the administrative or judicial process), 
are issues which any state considering similar legislation must ad-
. dress. The most difficult task in resolving these issues is creating 
ways to reach the variety of problems which converge in land use 
and development. For example, Vermont chose to include certain 
89 [d. at § 197.805-.850. 
90 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.12 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986). 
91 [d. § 380.05(2)(b) (West Supp. 1986). 
92 [d. § 380.04(2)(e) (West 1974). 
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development within the permit process based on the acreage of land 
the development affected. While this may be justified as an effective 
way to protect some criteria-soil erosion for instance-it was not 
an effective device for protecting historic properties. Consideration 
of flaws in Act 250 such as this, and comparison of Act 250 with land 
use statutes in other states, can provide useful guidelines for other 
states interested in historic preservation. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Act 250 is not particularly well suited for the protection of isolated 
historic buildings from demolition or damaging modification by pri-
vate owners, municipalities, or state agencies. The ten acre require-
ment will often place individual buildings on city or town lots outside 
the jurisdiction of Act 250, and at best application of the Act will be 
inconsistent. Moreover, it will be difficult to use separate parcels of 
land in order to meet this requirement. Furthermore, the extent to 
which land use legislation should encumber private property rights 
is a difficult issue, and the Vermont Supreme Court has tended to 
restrict rather than enlarge the jurisdiction of Act 250. 
If Act 250 is to be consistently effective in protecting historic 
sites, its jurisdiction must be expanded by legislation. Perhaps this 
can be accomplished with facility by eliminating or reducing the ten 
acre requirement when historic sites are involved in development. 
Such an amendment would seem justified because small scale proj-
ects have a proportionally greater impact on historic sites than do 
many large scale projects on other values protected by Act 250. 
Moreover, there is precedent for such an amendment: condominium 
and apartment project developments containing ten or more units 
are "developments" for Act 250, but are not subject to the ten acre 
requirement.93 Certainly the logic to this provision is the recognition 
that some small scale projects have a significant impact on values 
that should be protected. If legislative amendment is not possible, 
the other alternative is more vigorous protection of historic sites 
through municipal land use control. 
Legislative amendment will also be necessary to correct the prob-
lem that demolition of an historic building alone, without a plan for 
further development, does not trigger Act 250 jurisdiction. Perhaps 
the easiest solution would be to make demolition prima facie evidence 
of the existence of a plan. This would shift the burden of proving 
93 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (1984). 
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that no plan exists to the developer and would inhibit abuse of the 
Act. 
A second major area of concern is the absence of objective stan-
dards by which district commissioners and the environmental board 
can consistently determine whether a proposed development or sub-
division will have an undue adverse effect on historic sites. The 
continued absence of such standards may result in a successful con-
stitutional challenge to Act 250. A solution to this problem is the 
active participation in permit decisions by the Vermont Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation. Vermont's Historic Preservation 
Act should be amended to permit the Division for Historic Preser-
vation to adopt compatibility standards and criteria for proposed 
development and subdivision. In addition, the standard "undue ad-
verse effect" should be made less vague by changing the standard 
to "unavoidable adverse effect." 
In conjunction with these issues, the determination by the Division 
for Historic Preservation as to whether or not a development has 
an unavoidable adverse effect on an historic site could be prima facie 
evidence of their conclusion. In other words, if they concluded that 
a development has an unavoidable adverse effect on an historic site, 
the developer would be forced to rebut this presumption. 
Third, the definition of "historic site" should be amended to include 
those sites which are eligible for listing on the State or National 
Register of Historic Places. This will eliminate any doubt that the 
criteria used for determining eligibility to the State or National 
Register of Historic Places can be used by the district commissioners 
and Environmental Board when it is necessary to evaluate whether 
a site is historic. 
Fourth, there seems little purpose in denying appellate review by 
the Vermont Supreme Court to adjoining property owners and rule 
14(B) parties. Presumably, at that stage issues have been narrowed, 
and oral arguments and briefing do not create overwhelming admin-
istrative burdens for the court. However, to the extent this policy 
continues, the Vermont Division for Historic Preservation must be 
alert to their role as an affected state agency entitled to participate 
in appeals before the Vermont Supreme Court. 
Fifth, minor legislative amendments should resolve the ambigui-
ties apparent in the definitions appearing in section 6001. Section 
6001(3) should be divided into subsections to accommodate the var-
ious definitions of development. This would clarify whether the ex-
amples of involved land apply only to municipal and state projects. 
Also, the definition of "lot" should be expanded to include all inter-
ests in land, not just undivided ones. 
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These criticisms should not be interpreted to mean that Act 250 
is ineffective as a means of protecting historic sites, for that is 
untrue. Through its permit system, Act 250 provides an excellent 
method of insuring that the importance of historic properties is 
considered by developers. The concept is sound and is working. The 
extent to which land use legislation should envelop private property 
rights is a very difficult issue. Act 250 represents an admirable 
attempt to strike a balance between competing interests, and un-
avoidable flaws should be recognized as an opportunity for improve-
ment. 
